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IT'D LIKE TO BE MENTIONED, AT LEAST IN A FOO1NOTE, in the biography 11 someone will write someday about that great gentleman and scholar, Leslie 
C. Green. A number of years ago, when Professor Green was not well known in the 
United States, he submitted some of his essays on intemationallaw to T ransna~ 
tiona I Publishers, Inc. As a member of that board, the publisher, Heike Fenton, 
called me up and asked for my appraisal of a book containing these essays. She let 
me know that it would probably be a losing proposition, since essay collections (at 
that time at least) hardly ever repaid their cost of publication. I had an idea that 
could suit her and Professor Green at the same time. I suggested to Heike that she 
might want to consider going back to Professor Green and saying that although 
she would not be able to publish the particular essays he had submitted to her, 
she would be very interested ifhe would submit all the essays he had written on 
the law of war. Of course, I was familiar with these essays, and I thought that 
their collection in a single volume might work from a publisher's standpoint. 
The rest is history. Leslie Green graciously complied by submitting a number 
of his essays on the law of war, resulting in the book Essays on the Modem Law of 
War. Its fame and fortune grew, and it is now in its second edition. It has often 
been used as a text in military academies and undoubtedly influenced the Na~ 
val War College to extend to Professor Green an invitation to become a hold~r 
of the Stockton Chair-unusual for a scholar who is not an American citi:l .. 'l1. 
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Professor Green has served with distinction as the Stockton Professor oflnter~ 
national Law at the Naval War College and has continued to contribute to the 
development of the law of war as a leading scholar in that field. I feel lucky to 
have helped steer his (scholar)ship in the right direction at the right time. 
I am contributing some thoughts about genocide to this collection of essays 
in honor of my dear friend Leslie Green, precisely because genocide is not a 
topic that appears among his many essays on the law of war. If it did, I would 
feel preempted. Of course, Professor Green has talked about genocide in his 
discussions of the laws of war, including crimes against humanity (it would 
have been astounding if he had not done so). There is nothing he has said 
about the topic that I could criticize even if! were bold enough to do so. But be~ 
cause he has not contributed a specific essay on the topic, I submit the follow~ 
ing essay as a compliment (complement) to his works. Of course, in a way it is 
too soon to write about genocide. The law on that subject is developing rapidly 
as the result of the work of the two ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for 
the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. In addition, various national courts 
have recently had occasion to consider charges of genocide. If! were to attempt 
here an essay that dealt with all the judicial glosses to date on the crime of 
genocide, it would be outdated the minute it is published. Thus, I will confine 
myself to considerations of a greater generality. I hope these can help illumi~ 
nate two major underlying factors in the recent and unique international crime 
of genocide, factors that will undoubtedly persist as a theme in the many judi~ 
cial developments in the near future that will elaborate upon, specify, and fur~ 
ther explicate the crime of genocide as applied to particular cases. 
The Need for a Coherent Definition 
The term "genocide" is popular with journalists because it seems to give an 
immediate and sensational dimension to their reports. Its overuse extends to 
academics who see no need to be careful about the terms they use. For exam~ 
pIe, the well~known political scientist Rudolph Rummel cited as instances of 
"genocide" (1) "the denial of ethnic Hawaiian culture by the American~run 
public school system in Hawaii"; (2) "government policies letting one race 
adopt the children of another race"; (3) "South African Apartheid"; and (4) 
"the Jewish Holocaust." I As early as 1951, Paul Robeson and William 
Patterson submitted a petition to the United Nations charging "genocidal 
crimes of federal, state, and municipal governments in the United States 
against 15,000,000 African~Americans."2 Clearly, the term "genocide" can be 
stretched so far as to lose any distinctive or coherent meaning. 
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Coherence is a virtue not just in legal definitions, but in enabling us to think 
about the relation of any given term to all nearby terms. Ken Kress writes: 
An idea or theory is coherent if it hangs or fits together. If its parts are mutually 
supportive, if it is intelligible, if it flows from or expresses a Single, unified 
viewpoint. An idea or theory is incoherent if it is unintelligible, inconsistent, ad 
hoc, fragmented, disjointed, or contains thoughts that are unrelated to and do 
not support one another) 
Coherence is important because it relates to the core responsibility of the 
judicial enterprise.4 Ronald Dworkin has argued forcefully for the overarching 
imperative of "law as integrity,"5 which 
requires our judges, so far as this is possible, to treat our present system of public 
standards as expressing and respecting a coherent set of principles, and, to that 
end, to interpret these standards to find implicit standards between and beneath 
the explicit ones.6 
Professor Dworkin's reference in this quotation to a "coherent set of principles" 
is later expanded: 
Integrity demands that the public standards of the community be both made and 
seen, so far as this is possible, to express a single, coherent scheme of justice and 
fairness in the right relation.7 
These general propositions take on special significance when applied to the 
judicial definition of genocide, the world's most heinous crime. Genocide is an, 
cient in fact and new in definition. In Biblical times there were acts of deliber, 
ate destruction of national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups as such. The 
Turkish slaughter of Armenians in 1915 is now widely regarded as genocide. 
But the precise term was coined by Raphael Lemkin in 1944.8 Lemkin used the 
new word loosely, including within its scope attacks on political and sociC).1 in, 
stitutions, attacks on culture and language, and even attacks on national feel, 
ings. His use of the word was so broad that it did not necessarily include the 
killing or harming of persons. 
However, when the horrors of the Holocaust gradually became known to the 
public at the end of the Second World War, the General Assembly of the United 
Nations passed a resolution affirming genocide to be a crime under international 
law. Included in the 1946 resolution were acts of destruction against groups on 
"religious, racial, political, or any other grounds."9 Although the UN's definition 
was narrower than Lemkin's, the inclusion of "political" and "or any other" 
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grounds still made it overly broad. For example, any civil war would automati~ 
cally constitute genocide because each side would be attempting to destroy the 
other in order to take over the government-in short, for political reasons. And 
by adding "or any other grounds," genocide would apply to any war at all. 
If in 1944 the concept of genocide was vastly overinclusive, and in 1946 
plainly overinclusive, in 1948 the definition was finally pinned down. Not only 
did the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of GenocidelO present an 
internationally binding definition, but the words of that definition have been re~ 
peated verbatim many times in constitutive instruments of ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals, the statute of the proposed International Criminal Court, and 
in various judicial decisions in national as well as international tribunals: 
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such: 
(a) killing members of the group; 
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
This language formulated in 1948 was well~chosen. Even though many of the 
delegates to the drafting of the Genocide Convention had their own agendas to 
promote, the result of their deliberations is a definition that is remarkably 
coherent in the sense I have been discussing. This is not to say that the 
definition is without difficulties; hardly any definition can ever be said to be 
perfect. Yet with this definition as a reference point, let us consider some of the 
specific issues that have caused some problems in relation to the coherency of 
the crime of genocide: "group," "specific intent," and the relation to "ethnic 
cleansing." Of course, other issues will arise in cases yet unlitigated, but as of 
the time of this writing, these three topics seem most salient. 
Restrictions as to Group Membership 
The most immediately notable restriction in the 1948 definition of "geno~ 
cide" is the exclusion of political groups and the concomitant decision not to 
make the idea of groups open~ended (in contrast to the 1946 resolution's inclu~ 
sion of "or any other grounds"). Why were political groups excluded in the 
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1948 Convention even though they had been included in the 1946 resolution? 
A sufficient historical reason is that the Soviet Union insisted upon the exclu~ 
sion of political groups, probably out of a well~founded fear that Josef Stalin 
could be accused of genocide when he presided over the largest political 
slaughter in history in the 1930s. But there is a much better logical reason for 
the exclusion of membership in political groups: such membership is voluntary. 
Thus, a person who joins such a group in a sense controls her own destiny. To 
be sure, if she is killed because she is a member of a particular political group, it is 
still murder. From the international point of view, if civilians are killed because of 
their membership in a political group (or any group at all), it is still a crime 
against humanity or (if the killing occurs during armed conflict) a war crime. 
"Genocide," to have standing as a separate crime, must be distinguishable 
from group destruction. The framers of the Geneva Convention settled on a 
definition that appears to have singled out victims of genocide as involuntary 
members of a group. There is something universally felt to be particularly hei~ 
nous in murder based on a group affiliation that the victim could not have 
avoided. Thus, of the four groups listed in the Genocide Convention, it is at the 
outset clear that membership in "racial" or "ethnic" groups is involuntary; a 
child is born into such groups by parentage. The "national" group is for the 
most part involuntary, as it is conferred by birth. In a small percentage of cases 
people may be able to emigrate and obtain a new nationality, but for the vast 
majority of people their nationality effectively remains involuntary. Only "reli~ 
gion," of the four categories, is of mixed voluntariness. Most people are born 
into a religion, and therefore their religious status is involuntary into their 
teenage years. Later, they may "drop out" or affirmatively join a different reli~ 
gious group. Yet they may be targeted in a genocidal campaign because of the 
religion into which they were born. During the Yugoslavian civil wars in the 
past decade, where in some provinces Serbs were in the minority and in other 
provinces Muslims were the minority group, group membership was identified 
in many cases by the victim's name. Under the Islamic religion, children are 
given one of a distinctive list of Muslim names, and in former Yugoslavia at 
least, non~Muslim children were not given any of those Muslim names. Hence, 
the name itself was enough to identify a person as belonging to the religious mi~ 
nority or majority in any given town. If a minority person stated that he had 
changed his religion, he probably would not have been believed by the 
persecutors. 
An instructive analogue can be drawn between genocide and the recent leg~ 
islative phenomenon of "hate crimes" in the domestic law of several countries. 
A hate crime is generally defined as a crime against a person because that 
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person is a member of a group that the perpetrator hates. Although the under~ 
lying crime is of course punishable under the criminal law, the penalty for the 
crime is enhanced if it constitutes a hate crime. In a recent shocking case in the 
United States, a black teenager was walking along on the sidewalk of a white 
Northern suburb, minding his own business, when he was suddenly attacked 
and killed by a white teenage gang. The gang had simply determined to kill the 
next black person who walked by. Although the murder itself was punishable 
by life imprisonment, the fact that it was motivated by a hatred of the group to 
which the victim belonged led the sentencing judge to deny the possibility of 
parole. 
Many criminologists and lay observers have lobbied against the enactment 
of hate crimes on the deceptively simple ground that "a crime is a crime, re~ 
gardless of motive." To the contrary, I think it is a civilizational improvement 
to deter especially the crimes and harms committed against people just because 
of their status as involuntary members of a group. To be sure, this kind of "dis~ 
crimination" has been around since Biblical times, and in the past few centuries 
the Jews in many countries have been the special target of such discriminatory 
maltreatment. The Third Reich brought this discrimination to a legislative fo~ 
cus, and if any "good" can be said to have come of the Holocaust, it can only be 
an enduring legacy that genocide under international law and "hate crimes" 
under domestic law are a coherent category all their own-a crime more hei~ 
nous than the underlying criminal act itself. 
Specific Intent 
There is no doubt that, from a prosecutor's point of view, genocide is a 
harder crime to prove than most international violations of humanitarian law. 
It is difficult for the prosecutor to discharge the burden of proving a specific in~ 
tent to commit genocide. Contrary to popular belief, this difficulty is not due to 
the fact that genocide is a more serious crime with more serious consequences. 
Rather, it relates to the fact that motive is a specific intent of the crime itself. 
Thus, in its opening clause, the 1948 Convention uses the word "intent," and 
each of the enumerated actions begins with the language of intent-"killing," 
"causing," "deliberately inflicting," "imposing measures intended to," and 
"forcibly transferring." 
Defense attorneys will typically argue that in order to prove genocidal in~ 
tent, the prosecutor must present evidence of a "plan" of genocide. This might 
consist of transcripts of a conspiratorial meeting, or a military directive, or some 
other evidence of a prearranged policy to destroy a national, ethnical, religious, 
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or racial group. Presumably these defense attorneys have a mental image like 
that of the Wanassee Conference depicted in a chilling film of that same name. 
The movie shows the meeting that took place in a Berlin suburb in January 
1942 in which Nazi leaders calmly discussed the complex plans of the "Final 
Solution." The movie, matching in running time the actual conference, was 
based on minutes taken at the conference itself and recovered when Germany 
surrendered in 1945. 
I doubt that any international criminal court will accept a defense request 
that the prosecutor prove a "plan" based on actual minutes or documents of 
such a meeting as the Wanassee Conference. As a practical matter, it is highly 
unlikely that any minutes or records will ever be taken again of a conspiratorial 
meeting to commit genocide; the threat to the participants of future prosecu, 
tion based on those minutes or documents is sufficient to rule out any such evi, 
dentiary compilation in the future. Indeed, a plausible hypothesis based on 
evidence coming out of the civil wars in Yugoslavia in the 1990s may be that 
some political and military leaders may have deliberately created records, doc, 
uments, minutes, and directives that were directly contrary to their verbal in, 
structions. It would be contrary to rational self, interest for any political or 
military commander these days to expose himself or herself to future prosecu, 
tion based on command responsibility. Instead, "plausible denial" might be cre' 
ated by giving face,to,face verbal orders that are contrary to the "paper record" 
of directives and documents that forbid recourse to violations of international 
humanitarian law. 
But even apart from sophisticated cover,ups and deniability, the need for a 
plan is overstated by my hypothetical defense counsel. If a person intends in his 
own mind to harm or kill another person based on the victim's membership in 
one of the enumerated groups, that is sufficient for a charge of genocide. Per, 
haps if it is a single murder a prosecutor would not prosecute the defendant for 
"genocide" but only for murder; however, if it is part of an event where the de, 
fendant and others are killing innocent people based on the victims' group 
membership, or if the defendant himself is killing a number of people for that 
reason, then the charge of "genocide" is in my view supportable. 
A more nuanced problem concerning the proof of specific motive to commit 
genocide came up in the course of the preliminary briefing and truncated trial 
of Dr. Milan Kovacevic at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia. The prosecutor, Michael Keegan, cited public speeches and televi, 
sion appearances by Dr. Kovacevic in which he urged Muslim citizens of 
Prijedor to leave the town and go elsewhere because, as he put it, Serbs and 
Muslims cannot live peaceably together. These speeches occurred some 
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months prior to the civil war that raged through Prijedor, resulting in a take, 
over by the Serbs and the killing, raping, and forcible evacuation of most of the 
Muslim population. Dr. Kovacevic was charged with genocide-the first Serb 
to be so charged by the Tribunal. The question was whether his public speeches 
constituted evidence of genocidal intent sufficient to satisfy the requisites of 
the crime. l1 
As the lead counsel of Dr. Kovacevic's defense team, I met alone with Prose, 
cutor Keegan to discuss plea,bargaining possibilities. He seemed quite con' 
vinced that my client's public speeches and television appearances constituted 
proof of the specific intent to commit genocide. The indictment against Dr. 
Kovacevic did not charge him with any genocidal decisions or acts; it simply 
pointed to the existence of the speeches and television tapes and linked them 
to Dr. Kovacevic's political position as deputy mayor of the town ofPrijedor. I 
asked Mr. Keegan whether the prosecution had any evidence of any directive 
signed by my client that ordered the commission of any harm toward any per' 
sons in Prijedor, and Mr. Keegan said he had no such evidence. In fact, there 
was no evidence that my client did anything except the making of public 
speeches and the signing of routine municipal orders {such as the hour for tum' 
ing off street lights, decisions as to water supply, and the like}. 
As a plea bargain, Mr. Keegan would consider a reduced sentence, but was 
not willing to discuss changing the charge of genocide to a lesser war crimes 
charge. I argued that my client, as the director of the Prijedor general hospital, 
was a man of healing and not a man of killing. In addition, Dr. Kovacevic in, 
variably treated Serbian and Muslim patients equally, and he invited to join his 
staff at the hospital a number of Muslim doctors who had been the victims of 
prejudice in other Serbian towns. But Mr. Keegan replied with the image of the 
Nazi "death doctor" who may have been a man of healing but who did not hesi, 
tate to carry out inhuman and deadly experiments on Jewish victims. Our 
meeting was a standstill; we were too far apart for any plea bargain. 
I decided that Mr. Keegan's point was well taken. Ifhe could demonstrate a 
genocidal intent from the inflammatory speeches that Dr. Kovacevic made, it 
would be very difficult for me to rebut that intent by testimonials as to Dr. 
Kovacevic's character as a man of healing. Yet I was convinced from the volu, 
minous evidence and interviews with his family and friends that Dr. Kovacevic 
would never intentionally harm anyone. Whether I was right or wrong about 
this was not something I could know for sure, but I was sufficiently convinced 
of it to throw all my energies into a vigorous defense of this man. I would never 
argue to the Tribunal that heinous crimes did not occur, or that the Serbs were 
justified because of historical brutalities against them to commit such crimes. 
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Rather, my entire defense would consist of the specific innocence of my client 
to the charge of genocide. 
This brings me to my client's speeches and television interviews which, I was 
sure, would have a highly negative emotional impact upon the judges of the 
Tribunal when they were read out in court or shown on the courtroom televi~ 
sion monitors. They suggested that Dr. Kovacevic was something of a firebrand 
and idealogue, one who could be held guilty of contributing to a negative atmo~ 
sphere in Prijedor that made the subsequent attack by the Serbian army and 
paramilitaries all the more effective and brutal. I was certain that the prosecu~ 
tor would provide the requisite rhetorical underpinning to the speeches and in~ 
terviews, leaving me with an uphill battle to explain why those speeches and 
interviews did not constitute evidence of a specific motive of genocide. 
I believed that there was a completely different way to interpret my client's 
speeches and television interviews. He was doing his best to exhort the Muslim 
population ofPrijedor to leave town before it was too late. Although the Mus~ 
lim and Serb population in the town was at that time practically equal (at close 
to 43 percent each), Dr. Kovacevic knew from his position as deputy mayor 
that the strategic importance of the Prijedor corridor from the Serbian military 
point of view made inevitable a military takeover by the Serbian army. And in~ 
deed that is what happened in April 1992, followed by forced evacuations of 
Muslims and internment in detention centers, often under brutal conditions. 
Some Muslims were tortured and killed in those camps. 
I go into this level of detail to show that two diametrically opposite interpre, 
tations are possible of the same speeches by a public official such as Dr. 
Kovacevic. He could either have been contributing to an atmosphere of hatred 
or doing his best to protect people whom he knew would inevitably be victims 
of a forcible military takeover. How this would have played out at trial we'll 
never know; Dr. Kovacevic died of an aneurism in the detention center at The 
Hague after two weeks of his trial. How indeed would the prosecutor have 
proved specific intent? To be sure, Dr. Kovacevic never said to the Muslims in 
his audience that they would be better off getting out of town. The prosecutor 
would have underlined this omission. Yet a public official is not free to say any, 
thing he desires in public. Ifhe had put the matter so plainly to the citizens of 
Prijedor, he would have been accused of not dOing his job properly as deputy 
mayor. He would have been criticized for trying to get rid of half the population 
of the city instead of working with them and establishing conditions of peace 
and mutual trust. Thus, knowing what he knew about Serbian military plans, 
he could only speak in a kind of code. He said things such as "The Serbs and 
Muslims can never live in peace together even in a hundred years." Coming 
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from a Serb, this kind of talk could signal to the Muslims in his audience, "get 
out of town while you can." But the opposite interpretation is also possible: that 
Dr. Kovacevic was contributing to an atmosphere of hatred. Surely if he had 
himself acted overtly-such as signing an order for the destruction or harm or 
even incarceration of Muslim citizens, or himself participating in any acts of 
torture or murder-then his public speeches would have been sufficient, in my 
opinion, to satisfy the prosecution's burden to prove genocide. But without any 
overt act, with only the attribution of genocide to Dr. Kovacevic by virtue of 
his position as deputy mayor of the town, then the interpretation of his 
speeches as amounting to a specific genocidal motive would not appear to me 
to satisfy the prosecution's burden of proof. 12 
The foregoing dilemma of interpretation is, I suggest, often applicable to of, 
ficials accused of participating in genocide. An individual official may have 
been doing his or her best to mitigate the evil, to spare as many lives as possible. 
It is easy after the fact for us to say that such an official should simply have re, 
signed. But in a situation where the official is bucking a pervasive tide, resigna' 
tion would simply lead to his or her replacement by a less principled person. 
The argument is a logical one: if a person of principle is morally required to re, 
sign rather than participate in a genocidal plan (a plan that she would do her 
best to frustrate if she stayed in office), then if she is replaced by another person 
of equal or higher principles, the same logic would compel the latter to resign as 
well. Hence, resignation out of moral scruples will tend to lead to replacement 
by persons who have no moral scruples. Accordingly, courts should be alert to 
these individual moral dilemmas and not be too ready to condemn any official 
"associated" with a genocidal plan (or other violations of humanitarian war) as 
legally complicitous with the crime. To do so would be to swing too far in a 
counterproductive direction. The requirement of specific intent in the defini, 
tion of genocide should be proven by convincing evidence even if it may result 
in a protracted trial, due to the danger (of which the Kovacevic case may be an 
example) not only of convicting an innocent person but of convicting a moral 
hero. 
Conclusion: Coherence and Distinctiveness 
The crime of genocide is the newest international crime. It must be kept as a 
separate, distinct, and coherent concept. It is the first truly subjective crime; all 
other crime, though requiring mens rea, requires only that the defendant con' 
sciously committed the criminal acts. In the case of genocide, however, the un' 
derlying criminal acts are no different from the acts required to prove ordinary 
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crimes. The difference is one of motive. What is being punished by the crime of 
genocide is the selection of victims according to their involuntary membership 
in four kinds of groups: national, ethnical, racial, or religious. The distinctive~ 
ness of this new crime turns on how seriously prosecutors, defense counsel, and 
judges in future cases take and examine evidence of a defendant's motives. 
The coherence of the crime of genocide is partly a result of taking specific 
motive seriously, but also a result of keeping the four enumerated groups clearly 
in mind. To extend the crime of genocide to killings-even mass killings-that 
are not based on membership in the four groups is to cheapen the concept and 
eventually render it redundant. If genocide, as I have argued, constitutes an ad~ 
vance in the development of human rights in our civilization, it ought to be in~ 
terpreted and applied in accordance with a coherent and distinct 
interpretation of the remarkable language defining the crime that was brought 
into being by the Genocide Convention. 
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11. I omit here the critical issue of whether Dr. Kovacevic was part of the authority and 
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